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tional right; as the Supreme Court of Alaska has shown in Ravin where
the right to privacy was expanded to even protect the use of marijuana.5 8
Therefore, state interest in invading the home to prevent the use of
marijuana must be motivated by some perceptible need to protect the
public at large or to protect the individual user against a genuine threat
to -his health and welfare; and no such interest was shown in this case.
In a recent law review article it was suggested that a society that
allows its citizens some freedom to pursue sensual happiness with minor
harm to themselves might choose a regulatory scheme similar to that
used for control of alcohol. It was further stated that
• . .the preferable solution is no doubt legislative and there are some
signs that reform is coming. But until that time close judicial scrutiny
of existing laws might at least afford some protection to what many
agree is a protectable interest: The right of an individual, in, the
privacy of ,his home, to indulge in conduct that is harmful, if at all,
only -to himself.5 9
The Supreme Court of Alaska should be commended for taking the
initial bold step in holding that the right of privacy which surrounds the
home is so dear as to protect even the possession and use of marijuana.
This opinion can be a model and can serve as a resource guide for
writing the privacy argument to include protection of private use of
marijuana in other jurisdictions.
JANET KNIGHT BREECE

Donaldson v. O'Connor: Constitutional Right to
Treatment for the Involuntarily Civilly Committed
I.

INTRODUCTION

The law has deemed it in the best interests of society to commit the
mentally ill. In effect, to remove a certain segment of the population that
is not able to adequately cope with the realities of day to day living. That
segment is so small, 1 and the line of proof between sanity and insanity
so nebulous, 2 that the individual liberties guaranteed to each citizen
within that group have become jeopardized.
58. 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. at 693.
59. Id. at 760.
1. In 1972, 404,000 patients were admitted to state mental institutions: 41.8 percent were involuntarily committed. Note, Developments in the Law, Civil Commitment
of the Mentally Ill, 87 HAav. L. REv. 1190, 1193 (1974).

2. The Supreme Court is not sure that "mental illness" can be defined easily: "As-
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DONALDSON v. O'CONNOR
The case of Donaldson v. O'Connor,' decided in June of 1975 by the
Supreme Court, presented the question of whether or not the fourteenth
amendment guarantees a right to treatment to persons involuntarily
civilly committed to state mental hospitals. The Court held that the
Constitution did indeed guarantee such a right, but failed to go further
in its deliberations. Nevertheless, the Court resoundingly came down in
favor of those persons who were committed against their will, and blew
the breath of life into those mental patients who, like Donaldson, may
have been forced to stay in state hospitals long after they should have
been released.
II.

THE CASE

Kenneth Donaldson was civilly committed to the Florida State Hospital at Chattahootchee in January of 1957, 4 diagnosed as a paranoid
schizophrenic. There had been a brief hearing before a county judge 5 in
Pinellas County, Florida," on the petition of Donaldson's father. 7
Twelve days later he was admitted to the state hospital, where he
remained for fourteen and one half years. Throughout that time, Donaldson repeatedly denied that he was mentally ill. He requested release,
continually asserted that he was dangerous to no one, including himself,
and demanded adequate treatment for his supposed illness.' Although
he had been committed for "care, maintenance, and treatment,"9 under
Florida Statutes'0 that have since been repealed, the evidence showed
suming that that term can be given a reasonably precise content and that the 'mentally

ill' can be identified with reasonable accuracy ....

." Donaldson v. O'Connor, 43

U.S.L.W. 4930, at 4933 (U.S. June 24, 1975); See also Greenwood v. United States, 350

U.S. 366, 375 (1957), concerning the complexities of mental treatment.
Serious questions have also been raised as to what constitutes "mental disease" and
"treatment". See Szasz, The Right to Health, 57 Gro. L.J. 734 (1969); and Lenismore,
Malmquist, and Meehl, On the Justification for Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. Rlv.
75, 93 (1968), for the unsusceptibility to treatment of paranoid schizophrenia.
3. 43 U.S.L.W. 4930 (U.S. June 24, 1975).
4. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 504, at 509 (1974).
5. The committing judge told Donaldson that he was being sent to the hospital for

"a few weeks", to "take some of this new medication", after which he was certain that
Donaldson would be "all right" and would "come back here". Id. at 510.

6. Donaldson v. O'Connor, supra note 4.
7. Donaldson had come to visit his parents over Christmas and had made statements that led his father to believe that Donaldson was suffering from delusions.
8. Donaldson v. O'Connor, supra note 3, at 4930.
9. Id.

10. The judicial commitment proceedings were pursuant to § 394.22(11) of the
State Public Health Code which provided:

Whenever any person who has been adjudged mentally incompetent requires con-

finement or restraint to prevent self-injury or violence to others, the said judge shall
direct that such person be forthwith delivered to a superintendent of a Florida state

hospital for the mentally ill, after admission has been authorized under regulations
approved by the board of commissioners of state institutions for care, maintenance
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that his confinement was merely enforced custodial care. 1
Dr. J. B. O'Connor was the hospital's superintendent during most of
Donaldson's confinement, and was his attending physician for 18
months. 2 He described Donaldson's care as milieu therapy,'1 but witnesses from the hospital staff conceded that such treatment, in Donaldson's case, consisted of confinement in the "milieu" of a mental hospi14
tal.
The patient had been kept in a ward with 60 others, with barely
enough room to walk between the beds.' 5 Many patients were under
criminal commitment.'6 Donaldson requested ground privileges, occupational training,"7 and an opportunity to discuss his case with
O'Connor or other staff members. These requests were all denied. 8
During his confinement, Donaldson had posed no threat to the other
patients, nor had he shown any signs of suicidal tendencies. It was 1also
acknowledged by one of O'Connor's codefendants that Donaldson could
have earned a living outside the hospital; 19 and responsible persons had
offered to provide him with any necessary care he might need upon his
release.2 0
and treatment, as provided in sections 394.00, 394.24, 394.25, 394.26, or make such
other disposition of him as he may be permitted by law ...
FLA. LAws ExTRA SEssIoN, c.31403, § 1 (1955-1956).

11. Donaldson v. O'Connor, supra note 3, at 4931.
12. Donaldson v. O'Connor, supra note 4, at 514.
13. See Halpern, A Practicing Lawyer Views the Right to Treatment, 57 GEO. L.J.
782 (1969), in which he raises questions about milieu therapy.
14. Justice Burger, in his concurring opinion, offered soothing words for the practitioners of milieu therapy:
True, it is capable of being used simply to cloak official indifference, but the reality
is that some mental abnormalities respond to no known treatment. Also some
mental patients respond, as do persons suffering from a variety of physiological ailments, to what is loosely called 'milieu treatment,' i.e., keeping them comfortable,
well-nourished, and in a protected environment. It is not for us to say in the baffling field of psychiatry that 'milieu therapy' is always a pretense.
Donaldson v. O'Connor, supra note 3, at 4934.
15. A third of the patients in the ward were criminals.
16. Donaldson v. O'Connor, supra note 4, at 511.
17. According to Donaldson, Dr. Gumanis did not want him to go into occupational
therapy, because Gumanis feared that he would learn touch-typing and would use this
skill, in Donaldson's words, to "write writs", that is, to prepare habeas corpus petitions.
Id. at 514.
18. Donaldson v. O'Connor, supra note 3, at 4931.
19. He had worked for some fourteen years prior to his commitment. After release,
he obtained a responsible job in hotel administration.
20. In 1963, a halfway house for mental patients, Helping Hands, Inc., asked
O'Connor to release Donaldson to its care. A supporting letter was also sent by the
Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry and Neurology. O'Connor refused, stating that the patient could only be released to his parents. At the time, Donaldson was fifty-five, and
his parents were too elderly to take responsibility for him. Even so, O'Connor never
informed Donaldson's parents of the offer.
Between 1964 and 1968, a college classmate of Donaldson's, John Lembcke, requested
on four occasions that he be allowed to take custody of Donaldson. The record shows
that Lembcke was a serious and responsible person and quite able to take care of Donaldson; nevertheless, his requests were refused.
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In 1971 Donaldson brought a class action on behalf of all the patients
in his ward, seeking damages under the fourteenth amendment2 1 and §
1983,22 and habeas corpus for the release of himself and of the class,
and also seeking an injunction requiring the hospital to provide treatment. Donaldson was released shortly thereafter; but the district court
dismissed the class action2" and only considered the prayer for damages" against his attending physicians." The jury was instructed that
the plaintiff had a constitutional right to treatment, and it returned a
verdict against two of the defendants. 2 6
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
district court, and held: "Where a nondangerous patient is involuntarily civilly committed to a [sic] State mental hospital, there is a constitutional right to receive treatment as will accord a reasonable
opportunity
27
to be cured or to improve the patient's mental condition.
The Supreme Court decided that such treatment was indeed constitutionally required, but restricted the application of its ruling to those
patients deemed nondangerous to others or to themselves. 8 In so doing,
the Court took some effort to analyze the justification behind confinement of the mentally ill. A finding of "mental illness" alone will not
justify mere custodial care, nor will it sanction confinement in order to
provide a better living standard.2 9
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
23. Donaldson v. O'Connor, supra note 4, at 512-513.
24. The trial judge had instructed the jury that punitive damages should be given
only if the act or omission of the defendant was maliciously or wantonly or oppressively
done.
25. Originally five defendants were named in the suit. Three were dismissed from
the action: Dr. Francis G. Walls, who became Acting Superintendent of the Hospital
when O'Connor retired from that position in February, 1971; Dr. Milton J. Hirschberg,
who became permanent Superintendent, succeeding O'Connor in June, 1971; and Emmett S. Roberts, Secretary of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Service in
Florida at the time Donaldson filed his first amended complaint, August 30, 1971.
26. $28,500 was awarded for compensatory damages and $10,000 for punitive damages against Dr. J.B. O'Connor and Dr. John Gumanis.
27. Donaldson v. O'Connor, supra note 4, at 520.
28. The Court stated that the decision of the court of appeals was too broad, and
that this case did not present the difficult issues of constitutional law handled by that
court. Specifically, the court of appeals had implied that it is constitutionally permissible for a state to confine a mentally ill person against his will in order to treat his illness, regardless of whether his illness renders him dangerous to himself or others. Donaldson v. O'Connor, supra note 3, at 4932.
29. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-490 (1960).
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Furthermore, the harmless mentally ill cannot be incarcerated in
order to protect others from their eccentricities.3 0 As the Court stated:
In short, a state cannot constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by
himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or
31
friends.
Having quickly resolved the constitutionality of treatment for the
mentally ill, the Court turned its attention to the damages aspect of the
case. O'Connor contended that he should not be held personally liable
because he believed that he was acting under state law that authorized
such confinement. He claimed that he could not reasonably have been
expected to know that the state law was invalid. Rejecting this contention, the trial court refused to issue an instruction to this effect."
The Court said that in the recent decision of Wood v. Strickland,33 the
scope of qualified immunity possessed by state officials under 42 U.S.C.
§1983 was discussed, and the proper question for the jury was whether
O'Connor:
• . . knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took
within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of [Donaldson], or if he took the action with the malicious
intention to cause a3 4deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to [Donaldson].
An official under these circumstances has no duty to anticipate unforseeable constitutional developments.3 5
Since the court of appeals did not consider whether it was error for
the trial judge to refuse to instruct the jury on O'Connor's reliance on
30. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-26 (1971); Coates v. City of

Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969);
cf. United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
31. Donaldson v. O'Connor, supra note 3, at 4933.
32. The trial judge did, however, instruct the jury that monetary damages could not
be assessed against the defendant if he had believed reasonably and in good faith that
Donaldson's confinement was proper.

33. 43 U.S.L.W. 4294 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1975).

In Strickland, some Arkansas high

school students who had been expelled for violating a school regulation prohibiting the

use or possession of intoxicating beverages at school, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against the school officials, claiming that such expulsions infringed their rights to
due process and seeking damages and injunctive relief.

The district court directed ver-

dicts for the officials on the ground that they were immune from damage suits absent
proof of malice in the sense of ill will toward the students. The court of appeals, finding that the facts showed a violation of the students' rights to "substantive due process,"
since the decisions to expel them were made on the basis of no evidence that the regulation had been violated, reversed, and remanded the decision of the district court. The
Supreme Court remanded to the court of appeals to decide, in light of its holding,
whether there had been a violation of due process.
34. Id.; see also Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-248 (1974).
35. Wood v. Strickland, supra note 32.
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state law, the Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case36 so
that it could be considered in light of Wood v. Strickland.
Justice Burger, in his concurring opinion, first addressed himself to the
immunity issue. He pointed out the difficulty and uncertainty of treating
the mentally disturbed, and remarked that an uncooperative patient is a
hinderance to treatment. He stated that the first step toward recovery is
the acknowledgement by the patient that he has an illness. 3 7 But Donaldson consistently refused treatment that was offered to him,3 8 claiming
that he was not mentally ill and needed no treatment. In light of the
circumstances, Burger said this factor should be considered when weighing O'Connor's good-faith defense.
Also, Donaldson had frequently sought his release through the Florida state courts, and had repeatedly been denied relief. The last such
proceeding had terminated just shortly before the present case was
initiated.3 9 Burger argues that the attending physicians would have been
justified in considering those decisions as an approval of continued
confinement, 40 and such a factor should be considered by the lower
court.
The Chief Justice then refuted the analysis of the lower court and its
holding,4 and pointed out that the court of appeals' analysis had no
basis in the decision of the Court.42 Specifically, Burger was somewhat
alarmed at the conclusion drawn by the lower courts: that the rationale
for confinement was treatment. The Florida statutes in effect at the
time of Donaldson's confinement had no requirement that a person so
confined must either be given psychiatric treatment or released, and
there was no such condition in the original order of commitment. To
Burger, the lower court decision held that the state had no power to
36. By vacating the judgment of the court of appeals, that court's decision was
stripped of precedential value, and the Supreme Court's opinion is the sole law of this

case. See United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36 (1950).
37. See, e.g., Katz, The Right to Treatment-An Enchanting Legal Fiction?, 36 U.
Cm. L. REv. 755, 768-769 (1969).

38. Donaldson was a Christian Scientist and on some occasions refused to take medication. He also refused electroshock treatment. The trial judge instructed the jury not
to award damages for any period of confinement during which Donaldson had declined
treatment.
39.

Donaldson v. O'Connor, 234 So.2d 114 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 869

(1970).
40. The defendants' counsel did not raise this issue, and O'Connor gave no evidence
that he relied on such rulings as an approval for confinement. However, Justice Burger

said that it should be no bar in the consideration of immunity in light of the Court's
holding that the defense was preserved for appellate review.
41. The holding was that ". . . a person who is involuntarily civilly committed to
a mental hospital does have a constitutional right to receive such treatment as will give
him a realistic opportunity to be cured." Donaldson v. O'Connor, supra note 4, at 520.

42. See note 36, supra.
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confine the nondangerous mentally ill except for the purpose of treatment. He could not accept this conclusion.
As he goes on to explain, historically, custodial care was the only care
initially available,4" and curing the person sent to the mental hospital
was of secondary importance. Also, there was no known cure for a
number of mental illnesses, and custodial care was really all that could
be done. Hence, treatment was not even considered in the reasoning for
confinement.4"
The police power may be used to confine individuals in order to
protect the society from significant antisocial acts or communicable
diseases,45 and under the parens patriae power the state -has the duty to
protect "persons under legal disabilities to act for themselves." 4 6 The
procedural methods used by the legislatures to envoke this power must
reflect the best interests of the afflicted class, and procedural safeguards
are necessary.4 7 But that does not mean that the procedural safeguards
limit the power to confine only if the purpose of the confinement is
treatment. Burger again refers to the "stubborn fact" that some forms of
mental illness are incurable, and no treatment is possible. 4 8 Mere custodial care may be necessary in some instances,4 9 and Burger believes that
a state legislature has the power to make that kind of decision.
Burger next approached the quid pro quo theory5" advanced by the
court of appeals, which in essence says that when procedural safeguards are lacking, and the government has taken away certain rights
(i.e. the right not to be confined), the government must give some
consideration in return. The consideration here is treatment. Burger says
43. See A. DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA, 38-54, 114-131 (2d ed.
1949).
44. Id. at 98-113. See also, D. RoTlMAN, TIHE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM, 264295 (1971).
45. Cf. Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940); Jacobson
v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 1, 25-29 (1905).
46. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972); see also Mormon
Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 56-58 (1890).
47. Id.
48. See Schwitzgebel, The Right to Effective Mental Treatment, 62 CALIF. L. REV.
936, 941-948 (1974); Ennis and Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: FlippingCoins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 697-719 (1974).
49. See, e.g., Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657, 663-664 (1966).
50. The court of appeals described this theory as follows:
[A] due process right to treatment is based on the principle that when the three
central limitations on the government's power to detain-that detention be retribution for a specific offense; that it be limited to a fixed term; and that it be permitted after a proceeding where the fundamental procedural safeguards are observed-are absent, there must be a quid pro quo extended by the government to
justify confinement. And the quid pro quo most commonly recognized is the provision of rehabilitative treatment.
Donaldson v. O'Connor, supra note 4, at 522.
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this can be argued in reverse. That is, under this theory, the state would
have the power to confine an individual simply because the state is
willing to provide treatment, regardless of the individual's ability to
function in society.
He points out that due process is a flexible concept, and reflects the
best interests of society and of the individual. 5 The Court looks "candidly" at departures from procedural and substantive safeguards when
the state says the departures are for the best interest of the individual;5"
but at the same time, "judges are not free to read their private notions of
public policy into the Constitution. '5 3 In light of these due process
principles, Burger believes that the quid pro quo theory cannot stand.
The theory assumes that the rationale for confinement would apply
equally to all situations, but in fact, different interests are involved. He
compares criminal activity5 4 to that of quarantine5 5 to show the diversity
of interests, and says that the procedural aspects should not be, and are
not, the same.
Also, Burger is worried that the quid pro quo theory has transferred a
procedural matter into a new substantive constitutional right. The theory
assumes a lack of procedural safeguards (i.e. periodic determinations of
the patients' condition, and strict standards of proof for commitment),
and insists that the state provide benefits to compensate for confinement.
The courts should be confined to reviewing procedural devices for
confinement, and allow the legislature to make public policy concerning
the public welfare. 56
In summary, Justice Burger concludes that the analysis of the court
of appeals would allow two results: (1) the state's power to confine the
mentally ill would rest upon the condition of adequate treatment, and
(2) the state may justify confinement, and the resulting deprivation of
liberty, solely by providing treatment. Since some patients cannot be
treated, to limit the power of the state to confine upon the condition of
treatment would be a severe handicap, and the concepts of due process
reject the trade-off theory behind the quid pro quo argument.5 7
51. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480-484 (1972); McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245, at 249-250; McKeiner v. Pennsylvania, 403

U.S. 528, 545-555 (1971).
52.

In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, at 21, 27-29 (1967).

53. Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 246-247 (1941).
54. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 541-544 (1968).

55. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 1, at 29-30 (1905).
56. In Re Gault, supra note 52, at 71.
57. Justice Burger emphasizes that advocates of the quid pro quo theory have even
criticized the theory on this ground. E.g. Note, Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HAnv. L. Rxv., 1190, 1325, n.39 (1974).
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BACKGROUND

Traditionally, the power to confine has been based on two theories:
(1) the police power, and (2) the parens patriae doctrine.5" Under
these theories state statutes have been passed which allow confinement
on three grounds: danger to self; danger to others; and need for
treatment, or for "care," "custody," or "supervision."'5 9
The police power covers the patient who is dangerous to others. The
parens patriae doctrine covers those patients who are in need of care,
and where danger to self is involved, both theories exert jurisdiction. In
the present case the parens patriae doctrine is the applicable theory,
since Donaldson was concededly not dangerous to himself or others. 60
By whatever rationale, however, due process demands that certain requirements be met before the state can take away constitutionally guaranteed liberties. 61 A right to treatment was the main requirement proposed where persons were involuntarily committed.
Historically, mental patients were denied a guarantee that they would
receive treatment. 2 The state often did not know how to treat the
patient anyway, and merely confined the insane to keep them out of
harm. Dr. Martin Birnbaum first proposed a constitutional right to
treatment in an article published in 1960,63 but the first judicial recognition of this theory did not come until 1966, in the case of Rouse v.
Cameron.64
In Rouse, the petitioner alleged that he was not receiving treatment,
and the court said that since the purpose of confinement is treatment
and not punishment,65 the hospital must make a bona fide effort to
provide such treatment. However, the court failed to set guidelines to
assure enforcement of the right to treatment,66 and no clear path was
established for other jurisdictions. Some even completely refused to
67
recognize the doctrine.
58. See Note, The Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 VA. L REv. 1134, 1138-1139
(1967).
59. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 737 (1972); see Note, Civil Commitment of
the Mentally Ill: Theories and Procedures,79 HAR. L. REv. 1288, 1289-1297 (1966).
60. Donaldson v. O'Connor, supra note 4, at 517.
61. Jackson v. Indiana, supra note 59.
62. See AMERICAN BAR FouNDATIoN, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW (rev.
ed. 1971).
63. Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960).
64. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Prior to this time, procedural safeguards had
been the center of debate. See generally United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410
F.2d 1071 (2d Cir. 1960); Williams v. United States, 250 F.2d 19, 26 (D.C. Cir. 1957);
Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
65. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, at 455 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
66. Drake, Enforcing the Right to Treatment: Wyatt v. Stickney, 10 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 587, 592 (1971).
67. See New York State Ass'n For Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp.
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Nevertheless, subsequent decisions6" increasingly followed the Rouse
case. The main thrust behind these decisions was the fear of creating de
facto penal institutions 9 out of mental hospitals. Since the rationale for
confinement was not custodial care or punishment, the only constitutional justification for civil commitment was treatment.7 °
The quid pro quo rationale sprang from similar considerations. Federal courts have reasoned that since civil commitment proceedings lack
the same procedural safeguards accorded in criminal proceedings, the
absence of such guarantees is justified only through the promise of
individual may return to society or at least
treatment, in order that the
71
improve his mental health.
The case of Jackson v. Indiana7z held that the nature of commitment
must bear a reasonable relation to the purpose of commitment. Under
the parens patriae doctrine the purpose of commitment is based upon
the individual's need for treatment and not because he presents a threat
to society. Therefore, if treatment is denied, due process is violated
because the nature of the commitment bears no relation to its purpose.7 3
In order to decide whether or not treatment had been withheld,
"treatment" would have to be defined, and this problem has vexed the
courts. Without such a definition standards are difficult to formulate,
and without standards the right to treatment has been considered nonjusticiable by at least one court." It has been suggested that the Burger
Court might reject the right to treatment on just such a basis.75
In Robinson v. California76 the Supreme Court held that the cruel
and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment barred penal
incarceration for mere status. The argument has been made that the
eighth amendment would prohibit the incarceration of the mentally ill
wihout actual treatment, because such confinement would take the form
of penal incarceration. The patient would have been institutionalized
752 (E.D.N.Y.1973); Burnham v. Department of Public Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335
(N.D. Ga. 1972).
68. E.g., Millard v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1966).

69. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, at 785 (M.D. Ala. 1971); see Ragsdale
v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Tribby v. Cameron, 379 F.2d 104
(D.C. Cir. 1967); Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
70. Wyatt v. Stickney, supra note 69.

71. Welsch v. Likens, 373 F. Supp. 487, 496 (D. Minn. 1974); see Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1966); New York State Ass'n For Retarded Children
v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 761 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
72. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).

73. See Welsch v. Likens, 373 F. Supp. 487, 496 (D. Minn. 1974); Lessard v.
Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 473
(1974); In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 659 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
74. Burnham v. Department of Public Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ga. 1972).

75. See 46 Miss. L.J. 345, at 358 (1975).
76. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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(penalized) for mere status (insanity). This argument has been followed by several courts,77 but was passed up by the Fifth Circuit in
Donaldson, probably because it would apply to dangerous patients as
well as non-dangerous ones.
At any rate, courts have invariably recognized several remedies where
a right to treatment has been found. Included among them are habeas
corpus proceedings, 78 actions for damages under civil rights statutes,79
tort actions for false imprisonment or malpractice, 0 and actions for
declaratory and injunctive relief. 8 '
IV.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CASE

The Donaldson decision holds that those persons who are civilly
committed to state mental hosptials against their will are guaranteed
treatment. If they do not receive treatment they may be released. Theoretically, if this right to treatment had been in effect when Donaldson
was committed, he would not have been confined fourteen and one half
years, which2 was much longer than the judge who committed him
8
anticipated.
The Court narrowed its decision to the involuntarily confined, and the
question remains whether any right to treatment exists for the patient
who voluntarily requests confinement, or for the criminally confined
mental patient. If the same rationale is used (i.e., that since the justification for confinement is treatment, one cannot be confined without
treatment), then the decision would indicate that the voluntarily committed patient would also have this right. It would be hard for the state
to justify continued confinement just because the patient originally chose
to enter a state hospital, rather than the state forcing him to enter.
The criminally confined are incarcerated to protect the public under
the police power. Likewise, the dangerous mentally ill can be confined
under this power. Should a different standard of treatment be used for
dangerous patients? The Court did not directly address itself to the
problem, but by restricting its ruling to the non-dangerous the implication is that a different standard should apply-the reasoning being that
in order to protect society the state may legitimately confine a mentally
77. See Welsch v. Likens, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974); Stachulak v. Coughlin, 364 F. Supp. 686 (N.D. Il1. 1973); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala.
1971), afl'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
78. See, e.g., Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Stachulak v.
Coughlin, 364 F. Supp. 636 (N.D. I11. 1973).

79. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).

See Note, 27 OKIA. L. REv. 238 (1974).

80. E.g., Whitree v. State, 290 N.Y.S.2d 486, 502 (C.C.N.Y. 1968); ef. Burnham
v. Department of Public Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
81. See note 78, supra.
82. See note 5, supra.
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ill dangerous person without giving him treatment. This reasoning
would show a willingness by the Court to accept the proposition that the
hospital could in fact be a penal institution. But if it is a de facto
penitentiary, why have the patient in a hospital in the first place? Has his
dangerousness lessened because he is in a mental institution?
It seems logical that the reason he is in the hospital is to receive
treatment and care, otherwise he would be in a penal institution. Going
back to the reasoning of the Court (majority opinion), since the justification for confinement is treatment he must be treated or else he is
deprived of due process. Under the police power the state would have
the power to confine him since he is dangerous, but it seems incongruous
that he would be in a hospital if the real purpose behind confinement
was to prevent harm. Once transferred to a hospital, or committed to
one, the parens patriaedoctrine would supersede the police power and a
constitutional right to treatment would arise. That does not mean that he
should be released if no treatment were made available. Rather, he
should be sent to a penitentiary and cancel the illusion of care being
given by the state.
Justice Burger is upset with this rationale. His theory is that the state
has reasons other than treatment that would justify confinement, but he
includes the dangerous and the non-dangerous, the voluntary and the
involuntary, in one lump sum. The police power is always there to
justify confinement for purposes other than treatment. The parens patriae doctrine, however, is the focal point behind the Court's decision
and is a separate rationale from the police power.
It is important to note that the ruling of the lower court, which Justice
Burger cannot accept, holds that a person so confined has a constitutional right to receive "treatment as will accord a reasonable opportunity to
be cured or to improve the patient's mental condition ' 3 (emphasis
added). The last phrase is an attempt to limit the broad scope of
"treatment".
Under this limited scope, treatment has been offered to mental patients from the earliest times. Since so little was known about curing the
insane, the only viable remedy was custodial care. In itself, it was a form
of treatment because it was the only reasonable opportunity for cure
available. There were no other reasonable opportunities. In later years,
custody and treatment became two entirely separate concepts.
Under the Donaldson ruling, custody, without more, cannot be a basis
for confining an individual who is capable of surviving by himself or
with the help of others.8 4 If he is not capable of surviving safely,
custody is permissible under the ruling because custody would then be
83. See p. 178 supra.
84. Supra, note 31.
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the only treatment available. That is, there is no reasonable opportunity
to be cured, and the state may confine the individual under the parens
patriaedoctrine, or under the police power, or both.
Justice Burger also fears the possibility that the state may confine an
individual solely because the state will offer treatment. However, the due
process principles that the Chief Justice refers to himself8" would prevent that from happening, and there is no suggestion by the lower court
or the majority that such a situation would or could exist.
It is interesting that Justice Burger points to the factor that Donaldson
continually asserted that he was not mentally ill, and since acknowledgement of mental illness is the first step toward recovery, 6 the courts
should be reluctant to blame the attending physicians for their conduct.
This seems to be the Catch-22 of Donaldson's predicament. Hopefully
the majority decision has destroyed it. If Donaldson has no right to
treatment, once he was admitted he could be continuously held captive
by the state, regardless of the condition of his sanity.
According to Burger's analysis, to be sane, Donaldson should have
feigned mental illness when in fact he believed he was not. Once insanity
was admitted the doctors would have that on the record as an acknowledgement, and only then could recovery begin. In short, not to admit
insanity was to be insane. As a result, Kenneth Donaldson spent fourteen and one half years of his life in a mental institution. Most of that
time was spent unsuccessfully trying to get out. If this decision does
anything, hopefully it will prevent the future occurrence of similar
situations.
V.

CONCLUSION

It seems inevitable that state mental hospitals will have to increase
their expenditures8 7 considerably, and that the state legislatures are
going to have to increase appropriations for mental institutions so that
adequate care will be given to patients.88
If no care is forthcoming, harmless patients who can survive outside
the hospital will be released. However, under the present ruling, if they
cannot survive by themselves or with friends they will not be released,
even though they now have a constitutional right to treatment. In effect,
the state can withhold treatment upon a showing that the patient cannot
so survive. In this sense the decision is a hollow one.
LEONARD

T.

JERNIGAN

85. Seep. 181 supra.
86. Supra, note 37.
87. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, Financing Mental Health Care
in the United States: A Study and Assessment of Issues and Arrangements 137 (1973).
88. See Wyatt v. Anderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974), affd, 40 U.S.L.W. 2696

(Nov. 8, 1974).
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